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RECENT ADDRESS'
LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS
BY DR. ALLEN R. FERGUSON
Director of Research, The Transportation Center, Northwestern University
GENERAL HENEBRY, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

I feel honored to share this morning's Air Force Reserve Session with so
distinguished a list of speakers and panelists.
My subject is "Logistics Requirements," but to talk in a meaningful way
for twenty-five minutes, it is necessary to narrow the field severely. Consequently, I shall concentrate upon only one aspect of Air Force logistics,
namely, Airlift.
This is done not out of any notion that Airlift is the only or the most
important part of Air Force logistics, but because time requires concentration and because many reserve activities are intimately connected with
airlift.
In these remarks I propose to touch upon three things: First, some
general characteristics of war-time logistics requirements; second, the implication of these characteristics for airlift in peace time; and third, I shall
throw out a suggested means of more nearly fulfilling our airlift requirement.
To begin, then, some general comments about logistics requirements.
Here I wish to make two points. First, logistics requirements in war-time
are uncertain. More bluntly, we do not know what they will be. I would argue
that no one can know and that no one should hesitate to admit that fact.
Obviously, the greatest of the uncertainties is to what extent the Air
Force should prepare for a central, nuclear war as compared with a limited
war. There is a serious conflict here: The logistics posture suitable for one
is not ideal for the other. For example, in the central war, individual combat
units should, at least early in the conflict, be able to rely entirely upon
logistics support at hand; off-base support may be most difficult and unreliable. At the same time, it appears that surface forces in the earliest phases
may not be critical, and they may not even play any important role until the
issue is decided, and decided largely by the strategic air strength of the
major powers.
In a limited or local or peripheral war or emergency, quite the opposite
is true. The great weapons held in readiness to wage or, better, to deter
World War III may, in fact, stand-down during the limited conflicts, while
the tactical Air Forces, the Army, and the Naval Surface Forces will be
committed as early as possible in various degrees, perhaps fully. These will
be the forces requiring logistics support, specifically, they will require airlift
for, at least, some of their deployment and resupply.
There are other elements of uncertainty. When and where will the next
emergency arise? What weapons, what forces will be employed? With these
major uncertainties about the kind of combat to be supported, computation
of the tons of POL or of numbers of aircraft engines become rather complex.
So, too, does the computation of airlift requirements. It is quite unrealistic
to suppose that the Air Force or the Department of Defense can develop a
single war-time airlift requirement. This is a fact of life with which the
military and the public must learn to live.
I At the National Convention of the Air Force Association's Reserve Forces
Seminar and Workshop, September 25, 1958, Dallas Texas.
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Now, a second major characteristic of logistics requirements: Uncertain
as the future is, there is some reason to think that the most likely war-need
is for support in limited conflicts. In recent months we have seen the Quemoy
crisis and a major crisis in the Near East. Before them, Suez, Hungary,
Indo-China, and Korea. Half a dozen major crises with actual or potential
local fighting since World War II.
Unless we are to run considerable risk of losing in the end by being
unable to fight effectively in limited wars, the Air Force must be able to
support its own forces and those of the army in local conflicts.
Let me hasten to add two things: One, it seems clear that it is largely
because of the deterrent effect of the Strategic Air Command that the local
wars are more likely than general war. Two, consequently, the Air Force
logistics system must as first priority provide adequate logistics support for
the deterrent forces.
So far I have said only two things: namely, that logistics requirements
can never be even approximately accurate (and we must learn to live with
that fact); and secondly, that, while retaining the deterrence capability, the
Air Force must be able to provide in limited conflicts complete logistics support for tactical air and airlift support for the Army and Navy.
What are the implications of these rather obvious points for peacetime
airlift activity? First, it seems clear-although I have yet to see it proventhat speed in response may be critical in a local emergency. The preponderance of enemy ground forces in numbers appears to indicate that unless we
react fast, the possibility of defeat in the local area is extremely great. Any
movements of troops, equipment and supplies require enormous cargo tonnages. The fact that we are uncertain as to where the next emergency will
occur means we must have ability to deploy-forward or laterally. These
facts all point to a requirement that large air cargo capacity be available to
the military. Since we are uncertain also as to when an emergency will arise,
airlift must be kept continuously at a high state of readiness. This is costly.
The reserve components and CRAF provide some means of keeping at moderate cost an ability to expand.
Do we have the required capacity?
There is good reason to believe that the quantity of airlift available for
the war-time job may be inadequate. For example, in hearings last spring,
Secretary Sharp stated 2 in part: "Recent JCS estimates of emergency airlift
requirements show a steadily rising trend. The deficits * * * are primarily
in cargo airlift. * * * Today's emergency airlift requirements must be met
with today's resources, and the combined military and civilian cargo fleets
fall short of the mark."
Further, it seems clear that there is a great need to modernize the military air transport fleet. There are at present only two turbine-powered
aircraft in logistics use, the C-130 and the C-133. The great preponderance
of the MATS fleet consists of piston-powered equipment. There appears to
be wide agreement that modernizing is desirable both for reasons of military
effectiveness and for economy. A few months ago, during the same hearings,
Senator Symington stated 3 that ". . . We are building only 11/4 C-133's a
month. That is the total of modern strategic airlift airplanes in the United
States. Despite our commitments all over the world, we have only 16 modern
airlift airplanes for military purposes. .
To be ready to handle the tonnages required over the great distances
involved in wars around the Communist perimeter, piston aircraft simply
2 Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, U. S.
Senate, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, Department of Defense Appropriations for
1959; p. 1178.
8 Ibid., p. 1171.
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are not efficient. The cost per year in money and man power of maintaining
any high level of ready airlift capability can be reduced through modernization. So far as I know there is little or no argument against this proposition.
Why is not the modernization carried out, and why are the economies not
realized?
It appears that there are two main reasons; first, that it is difficult to
dispose of the existing fleet of piston aircraft; and, second, that to achieve
the savings in operating costs in future years requires very large investment
now. The remainder of these remarks will deal with the second problem.
Here is the problem: The MATS operation-providing continuous readiness to perform large-scale war-time airlift--can be performed more economically in new turbine-powered equipment of the right kind than it can be
with the present fleet. However, these economies require that new investments in aircraft (and facilities) be made now, or in the near future, to
achieve savings in the more distant future. One reason why the problem is
severe is that modernization will take a period of years. During these years,
the economies of operation will be building up, but the investment in new
equipment will more than offset them so that at first the total airlift budget
will increase rather than decrease. The situation poses very practical subproblems:
1. To achieve a future economy, the present overall budget must be
increased,
2. That increase competes directly with the procurement of weapons,
3. The need for transports is less obvious than the need for bombers, and
4. It involves asking Congress and the Executive to appropriate or
approve funds whose benefits (reduced budgets) will be reaped by
their successors.
This appropriations hurdle has been one of the really significant barriers
to modernization.
If some method could be found to permit net economies to appear in the
first year or two of the modernization program, and especially if this could
be done without requiring that the procurement of transports be at the
expense of the procurement of weapons, a major obstacle to badly needed
modernization could be overcome.
I would like to throw out one tentative proposal for achieving this. 4 The
proposal is simply that the Air Force lease rather than buy transports. The
opposite is a reasonably common practice, namely, for the Air Force to lease
Air Force-owned transports to operators. This proposal would involve the
Air Force's entering into a contract for a private company to purchase modern transports and to rent them to the Air Force under agreed conditions and
at agreed rental rates. It would be the responsibility of the lessor to raise the
necessary funds, say in the capital market, to finance the initial investment.
Such a contractual arrangement could take many forms. In the recent
House Appropriations hearings, 5 Resort Airlines proposed one form. The
contract could, for example, require only that the lessor furnish a complete
aircraft, deliver it to the Air Force at the beginning of its life and recover
it some years in the future. At the other extreme, a lessor could enter into a
contract to furnish the Air Force with some specified number of good flying
hours, with the lessor providing all maintenance and other logistics support
4 1 believe that this idea was first suggested to me a year or so ago in conversation by Mr. Charles J. Hitch, Chief of the Economics Division, The Rand Corp.,
Santa Monica, California.
5 Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House
of Representatives, Eighty-fifth Congress, Second Session, Department of Defense
Appropriations for 1959, p. 814.
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including, perhaps, servicing at the home station. Intermediate types of
agreements, such as one which calls for the contractor to perform major maintenance but for the Air Force to provide line maintenance and all servicing,
might be considered. The purpose here is not to spell out the details of the
contractual arrangements, but simply to explore the idea briefly.
Now let us consider the practicality of such a concept. I shall ignore its
"politics" and concentrate on a few substantive points. In order for the
scheme to be practical, at least these conditions must be fulfilled:
1. A mutually advantageous rental charge must be devised and agreed
upon;
2. The lessor must have sufficient financial security over the life of the
aircraft to make it worth his while to invest in the equipment;
3. The contractual arrangements must be sufficiently flexible to cope
with changes through the life of the aircraft; and
4. The costs of development and tooling must be handled in a suitable
manner.
Let us consider each condition in turn. First, a mutually advantageous
rental must be agreed upon. Since modernization will presumably decrease
the cost of operating a high level of war-ready airlift capacity, it should
be possible to compute a rental which would be less than the cost of operating
the existing piston fleet and still be enough to provide an adequate return to
the lessor.
Second, adequate financial security for the lessor: Even with an adequate annual return, the contractor must have some assurance that the
government will continue to lease long enough for him to recover at least
a substantial portion of his investment as well as a return on his capital.
Unless he has this or equivalent security, it is unrealistic to expect him to
be able to finance the investment in a fleet of modern transports. The simplest arrangement would be for the government to enter into an agreement
to lease the equipment for a period of several years. Under present law, or
at least under present practice, this may not be feasible. However, the
government does lease buildings and other facilities for long periods. Also,
if the advantages of such lease arrangements are great enough, there is
some possibility that the necessary legislative or policy changes can be made.
Third, the need for flexibility: At the beginning of this discussion, I
pointed out the need for some kinds of flexibility in logistics planning. In
these lease, too, it would be desirable for the Air Force to be in a position
to adjust to technological and military change. Clearly it should be possible
to expand the fleet; this seems to be simple. Adjustments in contractual
services would obviously have to be made by new negotiations. Reduction in
or termination of contracts could, apparently, be covered by adequate liquidated damages clauses in the original contracts.
Fourth, the costs of development and tooling: It is unreasonable to
expect the lessor to incur the costs of development and tooling for any transport primarily of military value. Further, if any one contractor should do
so, the flexibility of the government in dealing with several lessors would be
impaired. It appears that the government could, as is present practice, pay
for the development of military transports. Also, it could purchase the first
few production aircraft-say five or six-for operational testing and possibly for special purpose in this way covering the bulk of the tooling costs.
Undoubtedly, in attempting to put such a policy actually into effect,
administrative problems would be encountered, but a superficial check does
not indicate that there are any major hurdles. What then would be the advantages of such a policy?
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If it is practical, the leasing arrangement would appear to make the
expansion as well as the modernization of the transport fleet easier in terms
of legislative and budget barriers. First, during a program of modernizing
and/or expanding airlift capability, fewer funds would be needed for transports than would be the case under the present procurement policies. Furthermore, as soon as the economies of modernization begin to be realized, the
total airlift budget would tend to be reduced. That is, the savings would
show up as reduced annual budget requirements much earlier than under
the present system. Thus Congress and the Executive would not be asked
to make large investments whose benefits would accrue to distant successors.
Third, because the annual cost of modernization would be less in the early
years of a program, there would be less competition between transports and
weapons for funds.
In addition to these administrative and budgetary advantages within the
government, there may be some important advantages to industry in such a
policy. To the extent that it would in fact result in some additional procurement of transport aircraft, it would tend to lessen those pressures on the
aircraft manufacturers to which Dr. Paul Cherington refers in his recent
report on the financial problems of the airlines. Such considerations might
make a policy of this sort particularly timely. However, the passenger-type
transports now in production for the airlines may not be appropriate as
logistics aircraft.
Lastly, the further development by the military of efficient cargo aircraft
and experience in their operation promises to benefit the aviation industry
as a whole. In this context, it may be well to mention that there may be some
conisderable advantage in having military logistics carriers certificatable as
civil transport aircraft.
The Air Force must have large amounts of cargo airlift capability both
to provide for the support of local conflicts which are likely to arise in the
coming decades and to provide the general logistics flexibility needed to
cope with the uncertainty of logistics requirements. The budgetary and
financial barriers to expansion and especially to modernization of the airlift
fleet can perhaps be overcome in large measure by the renting of transports
from private contractors. At least the possibility of doing so seems to warrant thorough examination.

